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As car expertise increases, so does interference between the visual processing of faces and
that of cars; this suggests performance trade-offs across domains of real-world expertise.
Such interference between expert domains has been previously revealed in a relatively
complex design, interleaving 2-back part-judgment task with faces and cars (Gauthier et al.,
2003). However, the basis of this interference is unclear. Experiment 1A replicated the
ﬁnding of interference between faces and cars, as a function of car expertise. Experiments
1B and 2 investigated the mechanisms underlying this effect by (1) providing baseline
measures of performance and (2) assessing the speciﬁcity of this interference effect.
Our ﬁndings support the presence of expertise-dependent interference between face and
non-face domains of expertise. However, surprisingly, it is in the condition where faces
are processed among cars with a disrupted conﬁguration where expertise has a greater
inﬂuence on faces. This ﬁnding highlights how expertise-related processing changes also
occur for transformed objects of expertise and that such changes can also drive interference
across domains of expertise.
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INTRODUCTION
Face perception is often described as a domain of perceptual exper-
tise. Our skill with faces manifests itself across many different
tasks and is often particularly impressive for familiar faces. For
example, normal adults can recognize familiar faces with accu-
racy >90% despite not having seen some of these faces for over
35 years (Bahrick et al., 1975). Most people are as fast to categorize
an image as a “face” as they are to categorize it at an individual
level (“Bill Clinton’s face”; Tanaka, 2001). In contrast, observers
aremuch slower to categorize an image of a bird at a similar subor-
dinate level—for example, categorizing an animal as a “cardinal”
is slower than categorizing it at the basic level, “bird” (Tanaka
and Taylor, 1991). But even the processing of unfamiliar faces
outshines our performance with other objects in several respects.
For instance, observers can retain more faces in visual short-term
memory than they can other objects (Curby and Gauthier, 2007;
Curby et al., 2009). Face processing is also more sensitive to subtle
changes in the spatial-relations between features than object pro-
cessing (Haig, 1984; Hosie et al., 1988; Kemp et al., 1990; Bruce
et al., 1991).
Our skill with faces is believed to result, at least in part, from
our extensive experiencewith them (but see Kanwisher, 2000), and
to be mediated by the acquisition of a holistic processing strategy
(Diamond and Carey, 1977; Richler et al., 2011a). What holistic
means varies to some extent, as it is sometimes described as a
sensitivity to conﬁguration, a global (as opposed to local) infor-
mation sampling strategy, a situation where perceiving the whole
is greater than the sum of its parts, or integrality of processing
for different dimensions (see Richler et al., 2012 for a review).
These different meanings motivate authors to use a number of
tasks to compare face and object recognition. One commonly
used meaning of holistic processing is as a failure of selective
attention. For instance, Young et al. (1987) asked people to name
the identity of part of a face composite, and found they were
unable to do so while ignoring other parts of the composite.
When the composite is inverted or the composite parts are mis-
aligned, people can more easily selectively attend to a face part.
This has been replicated in variations on this original paradigm,
such as in matching tasks with unfamiliar faces (Farah et al., 1998;
Richler et al., 2008; Curby et al., 2013). Like several other hall-
marks of face perception [e.g., the inversion effect; Rossion et al.,
2002; Curby et al., 2009; the sensitivity to spatial frequency con-
tent; McGugin and Gauthier, 2010; recruitment of the fusiform
face area (FFA); Gauthier et al., 2000, 2005;McGugin et al., 2012a],
this kind of holistic processing has also been obtained for non-face
categories when expert observers are tested, for instance for cars
in car experts (Gauthier et al., 2003; Bukach et al., 2010), chess
displays in chess experts (Boggan et al., 2012), and novel objects
after expertise training in the lab (Gauthier and Tarr, 2002; Wong
et al., 2009).
Based on the idea that face processing can be understood as
a kind of expertise, it has been suggested that it may share more
resources with the processing of other objects of expertise than
with typical object perception. The logic is simple: if the per-
ceptual strategies and neural substrates were found to be similar,
this may lead to interference when two categories of expertise are
processed simultaneously. We originally tested this prediction in
an electrophysiological study using the composite paradigm to
measure holistic processing and a neural marker of expertise, the
N170. We recruited participants with a range of car-recognition
skills, from none to extensive, and developed a paradigm in which
participants processed faces and cars concurrently (Gauthier et al.,
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2003). Participants matched the bottom parts of face and car
composites, while faces and cars alternated. In this 2-back part-
matching task, we were able tomeasure holistic processing of faces
when presented in two different contexts: (1) Among normal cars,
which car experts were found to process more holistically than car
novices, and (2) among cars with inverted tops, which car experts
did not process holistically. Therefore, we expected that holistic
processing of normal cars would compete with that of faces, only
in car experts. Indeed, we found that faces in the context of nor-
mally conﬁgured cars were processed less holistically [i.e., there
was less inﬂuence from the to-be-ignored (top) part on bottom
judgments] than those presented in the context of cars in a trans-
formed conﬁguration (tops inverted). These results suggested a
functional overlap between face and car processing that is related
to an individual’s level of expertise with cars.
Since our original study, there have been other studies provid-
ing evidence of interference between faces and objects of expertise
using event-related potential (ERP; Rossion et al., 2004, 2007),
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; McGugin et al.,
2014), or other behavioral paradigms (McKeeff et al., 2010;McGu-
gin et al., 2011). There are also other studies suggesting that the
processing of faces and words may compete during development
and inﬂuence their lateralization in thebrain (Dehaene andCohen,
2011; Dundas et al., 2013). However, Gauthier et al. (2003) is the
only study that looked at functional overlap speciﬁcally in holis-
tic processing. The goal of the present study was to replicate this
ﬁnding (Simons, 2014) and to explore its underlying mechanisms
using baseline conditions that were not used before.
The measurement of holistic processing is relatively complex,
with holistic processing in the composite task quantiﬁed using a
difference score between two indices of discriminability (each a d′
measure that depends on a hit-rate and a false-alarm rate). The
design used by Gauthier et al. (2003) not only requires holistic
processing to be measured for both faces and cars concurrently,
but also the calculation of an interference index which is the rel-
ative amount of holistic processing for faces in two different car
contexts. A signiﬁcant correlation of this interference index with a
measure of car expertise can be obtained for several reasons, and
our goal was to try to understand what led to this correlation.
The interference index is a difference of differences: the congru-
ency effect for faces in the context of normal cars – the congruency
effect for faces in the context of transformed cars, with each con-
gruency effect being a difference score itself. One concern with
correlations with difference scores is that the variance captured in
a correlation can come from the main condition, the control con-
dition, or both (e.g., DeGutis et al., 2013). This is not necessarily
a problem, depending on the construct measured, but it can lead
to misleading interpretations. The difference score that yields the
congruency effects is central to the deﬁnition of holistic process-
ing as a failure of selective attention and authors generally do not
consider its components further (DeGutis et al., 2013; Richler and
Gauthier, 2014). In contrast, the difference between holistic pro-
cessing in the two contexts is not a unitary construct. The original
prediction is that interference occurs in one context (when both
faces and cars are shown in their normal conﬁgurations) and that
it is not found in the other context (when cars are transformed so
that they do not engage expert processes in car experts).
Here we ﬁrst replicated the original ﬁnding (Experiment 1A),
then unpack the effect in ways that were not explored before. In
particular, we ask whether interference as a function of car exper-
tise is attributable to the condition in which faces are shown in
a normal car context. To preview our results, we ﬁnd that it is
not, and so we set out to compare the effect to different baseline
conditions, in the hope of clarifying the locus of the effect. In
Experiment 1B, we test our prediction that when comparing to a
baseline with no irrelevant parts, it would be the car experts’ per-
formance that would show interference, and not car novices. The
baseline will also help characterize the interference as facilitation
in congruent trials or interference in incongruent trials. Finally in
Experiment 2, we replace cars with novel objects to assess whether
the interference between two domains can be obtained when per-
formance on the interleaved task is matched, but does not tap into
expert processes.
EXPERIMENT 1A
To assess the robustness of this effect, we ﬁrst conducted a
replication of the study previously reported in Gauthier et al.
(2003).
METHOD
Participants
Thirty-ﬁve individuals with normal or corrected-to-normal vision
volunteered to participate for payment: 17 self-reported as car
experts and 18 as novices (six women, one reporting as a car
expert). The rights of the subjects were protected according to a
protocol approved by Vanderbilt University’s Institutional Review
Board. The data from two novices were later discarded, one
because of poor overall performance in the task (54%) and the
other because he was an outlier (>3 SD) on our interference index
(see design and procedures).
Stimuli
For the car expertise test, 120 pictures of different year and/or
model cars and 120 pictures of different bird species from view-
points varying from proﬁle to three-quarter view were used
(Figure 1). In the interference task, 336 grayscale (256 × 256
pixels) composite images of cars (proﬁle) and faces (front view)
made out of the top and bottom of different original images (64
faces and 64 cars) were used (Figure 2; see Gauthier et al., 2003).
All images had a horizontal red line covering the seam between
the two parts. In half of the car images the top part was inverted.
The stimuli were presented on a 19-inch monitor with a display
resolution of 1280 × 960 pixels. Participants sat ∼70 cm from the
screen. The position of participants’ heads was not ﬁxed.
Design and procedure
Self-report of expertise is not always a good predictor of perfor-
mance (Diamond and Carey, 1986; Rhodes and McLean, 1990;
McGugin et al., 2012b) and thus participants were required to per-
form a car expertise test (Figure 1; see Gauthier et al., 2000) in
addition to the main interference task (Figure 2). This car exper-
tise test yielded a quantitative estimate of their perceptual skill
with cars relative to their skill with a baseline category, birds. Over
224 trials, participantsmatched sequentially presented, 256× 256-
pixel, grayscale images of cars and birds on the basis of theirmodel
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FIGURE 1 | Sequential matching paradigm with images of cars and
birds was used to measure car expertise (relative to a baseline of
performance in bird matching; Gauthier et al., 2000, 2005).
FIGURE 2 | 2-back interleaved part-matching task designed to measure
holistic processing for cars and for faces in a situation where the
processing for both categories overlaps in time (Gauthier et al., 2003).
Composite faces were interleaved with composite cars in either (A) an
intact (familiar) or (B) transformed (tops inverted) conﬁguration.
or species (seeFigure 1). The ﬁrst imagewas presented for 1000ms
and was followed by a mask for 500 ms. Then the second image
appeared and remained until either the subject made a response
or 5000 ms had passed. Performance on the bird trials provided a
baseline measure for individual differences at subordinate-level
matching for a category of familiar objects in the absence of
expertise. As in Gauthier et al. (2003), a car expertise score was
calculated by subtracting the d′ for birds from the d′ for cars for
each individual.
In the interference task, participants performed 1020 trials (60
practice, 960 experimental) in which an image was presented cen-
trally either for 1500 ms or until they made a response. Images
alternated between car and face composites (see Figure 2). Par-
ticipants pressed a key indicating whether the bottom of the
current image was the same or different from the last image
of the same category, triggering the presentation of the next
image. Thus, participants performed a 2-back part-matching task
in which they were told to always ignore the top of cars and
faces.
Similar to the paradigm used in Gauthier et al. (2003), car con-
ﬁguration was manipulated to inﬂuence the extent to which they
should elicit HP in car experts: (i) an upright normal condition
(Figure 2A) and (ii) an inverted-top condition (Figure 2B). The
two interference conditions alternated in 15 blocks of 60 trials
(a break was given every 30 trials). Half of the trials were con-
gruent, where the information from the to-be-ignored top parts
would lead subjects to make the same judgment as the informa-
tion from the attended bottompart (when compared to the 2-back
stimulus from the same category). The other trials were incon-
gruent; information from the to-be-ignored top part would lead
subjects to make the opposite judgment as the attended bottom
part.
Notably, if participants could follow instructions and com-
pletely ignore the top part of composites when making 2-back
judgments on the bottom part, it would make no difference
whether the top part was congruent or incongruent with the cor-
rect response for the bottom part. Thus, the degree to which the
irrelevant top parts inﬂuence judgments about the task-relevant
bottom part provides an index of HP (as inWenger and Ingvalson,
2002, 2003; Gauthier et al., 2003).
ANALYSIS
Face-matching trials performed in the context of carswith inverted
tops and those performed in the context of cars with upright tops
were split into congruent and incongruent trials. The car trials
were also split into congruent and incongruent trials. Sensitiv-
ity (d′) was calculated for the congruent and incongruent trials for
each of the face (upright car-top context, inverted car-top context)
and car (upright tops, inverted tops) conditions. HP was opera-
tionalized as the sensitivity for congruentminus incongruent trials
(HP = d′congruent – d′incongruent).
The Interference index was then calculated by subtracting the
amount of HP for faces in the high interference condition, where
the faces were processed in the context of upright cars, from that in
the low interference condition, where faces were processed in the
context of cars with inverted tops. This index provides a measure
of the change in HP of the faces due to manipulating the conﬁgu-
ration of the cars. Because modifying the conﬁguration of objects
of expertise has been shown to impact HP (Young et al., 1987), this
index will allow us to detect any trade-offs in HP between the two
tasks. Crucially the faces and the cars presented in both conditions
were identical except for the orientation of the top (irrelevant) part
of the cars, and therefore any difference in HP of the faces between
the two conditions can be attributed to the context within which
the faces were processed.
RESULTS
Expertise in car recognition varied from none to extensive. There
was little variability in bird-matching performance (none of our
participants reported any special experience with birds and bird-
matching performance was low, ranging from 0.12 to 1.38 d′,
consistent with their self-report) compared to car-matching per-
formance where d′ scores ranged from 0.37 to 3.76. Consistent
with past work, there was a modest, non-signiﬁcant, correlation
between car and bird scores (r32 = 0.28, p = 0.10).
Even though participants were never asked tomake a judgment
about the top, they apparently could not refrain from processing
both faces and cars holistically (seeTable 1). This bias was stronger
for faces than cars (t32 = 7.941, p < 0.0001, d = 2.81), this is
likely a result of more extensive expertise with faces (Gauthier and
Tarr, 2002). Normal cars were processed more holistically than
www.frontiersin.org September 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 955 | 3
Curby and Gauthier Interference across domains of expertise
Table 1 | Sensitivity (d ′ and % accuracy) and the derived measures of holistic processing and interference for subjects in Experiment 1A divided
in a novice and expert group according to a median split on the measure of car expertise.
Congruent Incongruent Holistic processing
(congruent–
incongruent)
Car sensitivity
Novices
Inverted car tops 1.57 (77.1) 1.03 (68.8) 0.54
Normal cars 1.39 (74.9) 0.62 (62.0) 0.77
Experts
Inverted car tops 1.90 (81.6) 1.61 (77.6) 0.29
Normal cars 1.93 (82.6) 0.97 (68.0) 0.96
Face sensitivity Interference index (HP new
context–HP old context)
Novices
Transformed car context 1.89 (81.9) 0.76 (64.8) 1.12
Familiar car context 1.80 (80.7) 0.48 (59.5) 1.32
−0.20
Experts
Transformed car context 2.41 (87.3) 0.82 (65.9) 1.58
Familiar car context 2.07 (83.1) 0.63 (62.4) 1.44
0.14
transformed cars, a manipulation check (HP expressed as d′
for normal cars: 0.86 ± 0.07, for transformed cars: 0.42 ± 0.09,
t32 = 3.601, p < 0.002, d = 1.27).
Faces seen in the context of normal vs. transformed cars led to
approximately the same degree of HP when expertise was ignored
(HP for faces seen in the context of normal cars: 1.38 ± 0.08,
for faces seen in the context of transformed cars: 1.35 ± 0.10,
t32 = 0.289, p = 0.77, d = 0.10). Critically however, when car
expertise was taken into account, HP for faces depended on the
conﬁguration of the interleaved cars; as predicted, individuals with
higher levels of car expertise had higher interference indexes (HP
for faces seen in the context of transformed cars minus that for
faces seen in the context of normal cars; r32 = 0.45, F = 7.67,
p = 0.009; Figure 3)1.
Intriguingly, while most experts had a positive interference
index, suggesting that they processed faces more holistically in
the context of cars in a modiﬁed, rather than intact, conﬁg-
uration, most novices had a negative interference index. This
suggests that car novices actually processed faces more holisti-
cally in the context of cars in an intact, rather than modiﬁed,
conﬁguration. We also looked at the correlations between car
expertise and each of the two face conditions separately: car
expertise did not predict HP for faces viewed among normal
1Here we subtracted bird scores from car scores to index car expertise, consistent
with prior work with this paradigm. However, in more recent work with car experts,
we have regressed out performance in a non-car task from a car task to assess
domain-speciﬁc effects (McGugin et al., 2014). The partial correlation between the
interference index and car d′, partialing out bird d′, was r31=0.38, p = 0.01).
FIGURE 3 | Relationship between the participants’ car expertise score
(sensitivity for cars minus their sensitivity for birds in the expertise
test) [d ′] and the face interference index defined as the amount of
holistic processing for faces when cars were in a new configuration
compared to the holistic processing of faces when cars were in their
normal configuration.
cars (r32 = −0.01, p = 0.96), whereas it predicted HP for faces
viewed among transformed cars (r32 = 0.45, p = 0.007), a
signiﬁcant difference (Steiger’s Z = −2.05, p = 0.04). These ﬁnd-
ings suggest that the interference between faces and cars occurs
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in the transformed car condition, which was not the original
prediction.
DISCUSSION
Consistent with previous ﬁndings, Experiment 1A provided evi-
dence of interference between face and car processing as a function
of expertise with cars (Gauthier et al., 2003). These data demon-
strate that interference across different domains of perceptual
expertise, as measured via the impact on an established index
of holistic perception, is a robust and replicable effect. However,
the effect was unexpectedly driven by an interaction between faces
and transformed cars. That is, car novices and car experts differed
more in their face processing in a transformed car context than
in the familiar car context (see Table 1). This is inconsistent with
the original predictions that motivated this task (i.e., that in car
experts, face recognition would compete most with the processing
of whole cars that produce more HP).
One reason why these ﬁndings are relatively difﬁcult to inter-
pret is that car experts may differ from novices in the amount
of HP in several ways. For instance, car experts may show more
HP of cars than car novices because they experience more inter-
ference from incongruent to-be-ignored parts, more facilitation
from to-be-ignored parts, or both. Likewise, the difference in HP
of faces by car experts and car novices in the different car con-
texts can also be driven by a difference in facilitation, interference
or both. In addition, while we measured the effect of car exper-
tise as a continuous variable, it may seem reasonable to predict
that relative to a baseline condition where holistic processing is
not implicated, it would be performance for the car experts, and
not for the novices, that would show an interaction with face
processing. But because our initial prediction that faces and nor-
mal cars would be mainly responsible for this interaction was not
supported, we decided to better characterize the effect. While
the theoretical signiﬁcance of whether facilitation and/or inter-
ference are critical in this interaction across domains is unclear
at the moment, the proposed link between expertise and holistic
processing makes a strong prediction that novices should not be
affected by the presence of the irrelevant part, while car experts
should.
Therefore, in Experiment 1B, we tested new car experts and
novices to provide baseline conditions without to-be-ignored
parts. These baselines will be used to estimate whether car experts
and car novices in Experiment 1A differ most in facilitation from
congruent to-be-ignored parts, or interference from to-be-ignored
parts.
EXPERIMENT 1B
To ask whether the expertise effects observed in Experiment 1A
inﬂuence facilitation, interference, or both, we presented partici-
pants with only the bottom half of each image. This experiment
provided baseline measures to which the sensitivity of congruent
and incongruent trials could be compared.
METHOD
Participants
Twenty-two (six females) subjects with normal or corrected-
to-normal vision and varying levels of car expertise who had
not performed in Experiment 1A participated in this study for
payment or course credit. The rights of the subjects were pro-
tected according to a protocol approved byVanderbilt University’s
Institutional Review Board.
Materials
Stimuli were the same as Experiment 1A except the top half of
each was removed.
Design and procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1A except only the
bottom half of the car and face images were presented (i.e., the
parts above the red line in Figure 2 were omitted).
ANALYSIS
The data were divided into expert and novice groups based on
participants’ car expertise indices (i.e., the difference between car-
and bird-sensitivity in the car expertise test; see Experiment 1A
for details). Consistent with previous studies, we deﬁned experts
as individuals with a d′ for cars >2 and a car expertise index
(car d′–bird d′) >1 (Gauthier et al., 2000). The data from Exper-
iment 1B was also divided into groups of experts and novices.
To facilitate comparison across Experiments 1A and 1B, the aver-
age expertise index for each of the groups was matched across
the two studies. This was done in such a way as to exclude
data from as few participants as possible, based only on their
car expertise scores. The resulting mean d′ and sample sizes
(Experiment 1A/Experiment 1B) for the groups were as follows:
Expert 1.83 (N = 14)/1.81 (N = 9) andNovice 0.37 (N = 14)/0.36
(N = 9).
In general it is more statistically powerful to use car expertise as
a continuous variable than as a dichotomous variable. However,
because Experiments 1A and 1B include different subjects who are
not matched individually but in groups of novices and experts,
we report next a series of ANOVAS on Experiment 1A alone and
relative to the baselines obtained in Experiment 1B in which car
expertise is treated as a dichotomous variable.
RESULTS
ANOVA comparing expert and novice performance in the 2-back
(tops present) task (Experiment 1A)
A 2 (group; novice, expert)× 2 (car top context; upright, inverted)
was performed on the HP measures for the new groups created
from the data reported in Experiment 1A. Consistent with a role
of car expertise in modulating the effect of car context on face
processing, as revealed in the correlation analysis reported above,
a signiﬁcant interaction emerged between group and car context,
F(1,26) = 5.97, p = 0.022, η2 = 0.064. Car context had a different
effect on face processing depending on car expertise; for novices,
inverting the topof the cars led to adecrease inHP for faces. In con-
trast, for car experts, inverting the top of the cars led to an increase
in HP for faces. There was also a marginally signiﬁcant effect of
group, F(1,26) = 4.13, p = 0.053, η2 = 0.090, suggesting that car
experts in general processed the faces more holistically. There was
no main effect of car context on HP of faces (F < 1). Planned
t-tests showed that while HP for faces among normal cars failed
to differentiate between car experts and novices, t(26) = 0.30,
p = 0.77, d = 0.12, car experts processed faces shown among
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transformed cars more holistically than car novices, t(26) = 2.76,
p = 0.01, d = 0.48.
Planned comparisons on HP for cars revealed more HP
for upright cars than cars with inverted tops in car experts,
t(26) = 3.58, p = 0.001, d = 1.40, but not in novices, t(26) = 1.03,
p = 0.31, d = 0.40 (see Figures 4A,B). In fact, HP was signif-
icantly different from 0 in all car conditions (all ps ≤ 0.0005)
except for cars with inverted tops in car experts (p = 0.13). This
suggests that inverting car tops made them easier to ignore for car
experts.
ANOVA comparing expert and novice performance in 2-back half
(tops absent) task (Experiment 1B)
A 2 (group; experts, novices) × 2 (category; faces, cars) ANOVA
on the results for the baseline task (no-top) revealed a signiﬁ-
cant interaction between group and category, F(1,16) = 7.34,
p = 016, η2 = 0.041. As expected, car novices and experts did
not differ in their performance matching face bottoms (p > 0.05),
but car experts were better at matching car bottoms than novices
(p < 0.001).
Comparison of Experiment 1A against baselines from
Experiments 1B
Figure 4 illustrates the results in Experiment 1A in each condition,
for car novices and car experts, relative to the baselines obtain in
Experiments 1B where no to-be-ignored parts were present. As we
have seen, these baselines indicate when participants performed
the task with only the to-be-attended parts, car novices and car
experts only differed in their processing of car parts, being better
in car experts. Now we use these baselines to interpret the results
of Experiment 1A and speciﬁcally ask in what way car novices and
car experts differ.
The results of planned t-tests comparing sensitivity (d′) in the
top-present congruent and incongruent conditions (from Experi-
ment 1A) with their respective no-top baselines (from Experiment
1B) reveals that HP during the top-present task was mainly due to
interference from incongruent top halves rather than facilitation
from congruent ones (Figure 4). Incongruent conditions led to
lower sensitivity than their respective baselines (all ps< 0.05) in all
cases except for cars with inverted tops in both groups (ps < 0.05).
In contrast, the only condition with signiﬁcant facilitation was for
FIGURE 4 | Sensitivity for car, (A,B), and face, (C,D), matching judgments
of bottom halves of composites for groups of car novices, (A,C), and
experts, (B,D), in Experiment 1A. In each graph, the results from the two
conditions in Experiment 1A (when the top of cars were upright and when
they were inverted) are plotted with the baseline provided by matched groups
of novices and experts in Experiment 1B, matching the bottom halves of
faces or cars with no top half present. Error bars show the standard error of
the mean.
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faces seen in the context of cars with inverted tops, in car experts
(p < 0.05).
Summary and discussion
Car experts experienced less interference than car novices for
transformed cars (Figures 4A vs. B), while they experiences more
facilitation from congruent face tops processed in this context
(Figures 4C vs. D).
One account of these results is that because car experts pro-
cessed cars in a transformed conﬁguration less holistically than
regular cars, they therefore recruited less HP resources. Therefore,
once the top part of the car is inverted it can be effectively ignored
by car experts.
Because the car context was manipulated, while the face task
was the same in both car contexts, and because car novices and
car experts did not differ in their processing of face parts in a car
context when there was no to–be-ignored part, it is reasonable to
infer that this is what led to facilitation by congruent face parts in
the transformed car context. Exactly why this happened though is
unclear but it is plausible that the transformed car context allowed
car experts to reduce executive control when car tops were easier
to ignore, and as a result also exerted less effort trying to ignore
face tops.
Most experiments using the composite task have not used a
baseline condition to examine facilitation/interference, but when
it has been used, the congruency effect obtained for aligned faces
was generally due to interference from incongruent parts, without
signiﬁcant facilitation (Richler et al., 2008). This is consistent with
what we observed here in car novices (even if the baseline was
obtained in a different group). This highlights how abnormal the
processing of faces among transformed cars was in our car expert
participants.
It should be noted that the choice of a baseline condition such as
the isolated relevant parts used in Experiment 1B can be difﬁcult.
In the comparison between Experiments 1A and 1B, there are dif-
ferences in stimuli (parts vs. composites) and in task requirements
(requirement to selectively attend or not).
Given the complexity of the 2-back interleaved dual task, it
is possible that other task components unrelated to HP and
affected by car expertise, such as more general effects related to
the executive control and/or short-term memory load demands
of the task, play a role in producing these effects. Experiment
2 investigates an alternative account of the interference between
different expert domains, assessing whether explanations appeal-
ing to contributions from these more general effects can be ruled
out.
EXPERIMENT 2
Our proposed account of why car experts showed more facilita-
tion from to-be-ignored congruent face parts in the context of
transformed cars points to how car experts were better able to
ignore inverted car tops. Experts showed no congruency effects
of inverted car tops while novices did. Non-face objects are not
processed holistically in the composite paradigm, which gener-
ally means that they do not show more of a congruency effect in
a normal than transformed (typically misaligned) conﬁguration.
However, there is sometimes a small but signiﬁcant congruency
effect for non-face objects that is not modulated by conﬁguration
(e.g., Wong et al., 2009; Richler et al., 2011b). There are situations
where training has amain effect of reducing this congruency effect
for stimuli in a transformed conﬁguration (Chua et al., 2014),
similar to the difference between our car novices and experts in
Experiment 1A.
The absence of holistic processing for cars with inverted
tops among car experts, but not novices, suggests an alterna-
tive account of the interference between face and car processing
that is unrelated to expertise. Because it was the transformed
car context that drove the interference effect, it is possible that
the same interference effect would be observed when faces are
processed in the context of any object category that does not
show a congruency effect, regardless of expertise. This would
suggest that an alternative account, grounded in the more gen-
eral demands of the two concurrently performed tasks, rather
than in participants’ expertise, would better explain this interfer-
ence.
In the original paradigm, the condition where car novices pro-
cess faces in the context of normal cars should had offered a test
of this hypothesis. However, there was a signiﬁcant congruency
effect for cars in car novices here, perhaps in part because they had
some non-negligible experience with cars (this congruency effect
could also be ampliﬁed by cars being processed in the context of
faces, see Richler et al., 2009).
Therefore, to test this hypothesis, we designed simple and unfa-
miliar stimuli in an oval shape with parts deﬁned by colored
gratings (varying in both hue and luminance, see Figure 5A) and
in a pilot experiment, we veriﬁed that their processing in the com-
posite task did not produce any congruency effect. Here we ask
whether faces processed in our dual task with these “egg” stimuli
would produce the same facilitation as observed in Experiment
1A. If the increase in the facilitation component of HP for faces
processed in the context of transformed cars is simply due to the
fact that the to-be-ignored parts of these transformed objects are
easy to ignore, then we should observe it here. In contrast, if
facilitation is not observed, this would indicate that the interac-
tion between selective attention to faces and the car context is
speciﬁcally dependent on car expertise.
METHOD
Participants
We recruited fourteen volunteer participants (seven females), to
match the size of the car expert group in Experiment 1. The rights
of the subjects were protected according to a protocol approved by
Vanderbilt University’s Institutional Review Board.
Stimuli
Face stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1. Stimuli were con-
structed from 64 oval shapes or “eggs” approximately the same
size as the face stimuli with 15 vertical stripes of two alternat-
ing colors. Twelve different colors were used, selected from the
Adobe Photoshop© palette to be similar but still distinguishable
(all shades of blue, green or purple). The 64 original eggs were
split in half and recombined (in the same manner as the face
stimuli) to create 128 composite eggs used in the experiment (see
Figure 5A).
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FIGURE 5 | Results for Experiment 2. (A) Examples of egg stimuli, this pair has the same bottom but incongruent tops. (B) Sensitivity for egg and face
judgments in Experiment 2. The results of congruent and incongruent trials are plotted against the baseline obtained from the same subjects performing the
same task with no top half present.
Design and procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1, except that
whole faces were processed in only one context, that is the orien-
tation of the top part of the egg was not manipulated (Figure 5A).
The same participants also performed a baseline task with no tops
on faces or eggs (as in Experiment 1B). There were an equal num-
ber of top-present and no-top trials, presented in four blocks of
240 trials. The two conditions alternated and their orderwas coun-
terbalanced across participants. As in Experiment 1, participants
performed 2-back judgments on the bottom half of all images.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As expected, the eggs produced a pattern of sensitivity very similar
to that of cars with an inverted top in Experiment 1 (Figure 5B).
There was no signiﬁcant HP for eggs, t(13) = 1.21, p = 0.25,
d = 0.67. Sensitivity for the egg baseline did not differ from the
baseline for cars among car experts in Experiment 1, t(21) = 0.77,
p = 0.45, d = 0.34. Sensitivity for eggs was also not signiﬁcantly
different from that for cars with inverted tops among experts in
Experiment 1, both in the congruent, t(26) = 0.68, p = 0.50,
d = 0.27, and incongruent conditions, t(26) = 1.16, p = 0.26,
d = 0.45.
However, unlike in Experiment 1, this context did not lead
to facilitation for congruent face trials. There was no signiﬁ-
cant facilitation (congruent trials relative to no-top baseline) for
faces processed in the context of eggs, t(13) = 1.97, p = 0.07,
d = 1.09. Comparing with Experiment 1, the estimate of facil-
itation from faces among eggs was both indistinguishable from
that obtained from car novicesmatching faces among transformed
cars, t(26) = 1.27, p = 0.22, d = 0.50, and signiﬁcantly less than
that obtained from car experts matching faces among cars with
inverted tops, t(26) = 2.39, p = 0.02, d = 0.94.
The results of Experiment 2 suggest that it is not the lack of
HP from the transformed car context per se that led to facilitation
from congruent face trials in Experiment 1 as the egg stimuli were
also not processed holistically, yet did not impact holistic face
perception. Further, theﬁndings of Experiment 1 alsodemonstrate
that the interferenceswas not simply a general effect of participants
car expertise (because in the upright car condition there was no
facilitation from the to-be-ignored part for faces) nor because
faces were processed among cars (because facilitation for faces
was not obtained in car novices). Rather, face HP was speciﬁcally
inﬂuenced by the concurrent processing of transformed objects of
expertise.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our results replicated the interference between holistic process-
ing of faces and cars observed in Gauthier et al. (2003). Having
found that the interaction depended on the processing of faces
among transformed cars, we investigated these effects further
by using a dual-task with isolated parts to partition congruency
effects into interference from incongruent parts and facilitation
from congruent parts. We found that car expertise was associ-
ated with less interference from incongruent car parts, and that
in this context, congruent face parts produced more facilitation.
Finally, we showed that this facilitation effect for faces was not
obtained in another dual task with objects that produced no
congruency effect, suggesting that the interaction depends on
expertise.
Our results highlight the fact that transformed objects of exper-
tise can lead to effects that are distinct from control objects. While
there has been much more focus on how the processing of whole
objects of expertise is special (both faces and objects), there is no
question that experts also process parts differently. This is most
clearly shown in our results by the advantage of car experts on
car novices for car part performance. There are other examples
of transformed objects of expertise producing effects that are dis-
tinct from control objects. For example, the ERP response (N170)
to inverted faces is larger than the response for upright faces and
delayed by 10 ms, while other objects elicit a response of much
smaller amplitude and invariant to orientation (Rossion et al.,
2000). This is also found in subjects who have been trained with
non-face objects (Rossion et al., 2002). It is possible that these
responses triggered by transformed objects of expertise index a
mechanism that can interfere with expert processing of objects
from another category.
Recent ﬁndings from studies of other domains of expertise,
such as chess, that have also been shown to result in increasedHPas
indexed via the composite task, support the suggestion that trans-
formed stimuli of expertise can trigger stronger responses in brain
regions linked with perceptual expertise than their intact versions.
For example, greater FFA activationwas found in response to chess
stimuli among chess experts when the structure of the chess stim-
uli was distorted compared to intact (Bilalic´ et al., 2011). Further,
recent ﬁndings suggest that disrupted objects of expertise, such as
the transformed cars used here, may trigger a search for structure
or meaningful chunks by experts that appears to also involve a
frontal-parietal network (Bartlett et al., 2013; Rennig et al., 2013;
see also Bor and Owen, 2007). These existing ﬁndings, and the
frequency with which transformed objects of experts (inverted,
scrambled, misaligned etc.) are used as a control or compari-
son stimulus category, highlight the importance of further studies
exploring the processing of such objects among experts.
Another possibility is that the expertise-related interference
between face and car processing primarily reﬂects an attention-
based effect. For instance, because car experts can more easily
selectively attend to the bottom part and thus ignore the (task-
irrelevant) top part in the transformed car condition, they may
“relax” control of their attention in this task-context, resulting
in more intrusions of congruent face parts. The effect could be
carried by facilitation because interference from incongruent face
parts may already be strong to start with. Our egg control task
suggests that such facilitation is not observed in any situation
where the to-be-ignored part is easily ignored – perhaps a cer-
tain degree of ﬂuency with the relevant parts is also required.
This account is obviously quite speculative andwill require further
testing.
Although this study cannot reveal where in the brain inter-
actions between faces and cars may occur, our task is likely to
engage parietal and frontal areas implicated in short-term mem-
ory (Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Belger et al., 1998) as well as the
FFA (Courtney et al., 1997; Grady et al., 1998; Haxby et al., 2000;
Druzgal and D’Esposito, 2001),which is the part of the brainmost
associated with the idea of a “face module” (Kanwisher et al., 1997;
McCarthy et al., 1997). Activity in the FFA increases directly with
the short-term memory load for faces (Druzgal and D’Esposito,
2001). This region is a plausible candidate for a locus of inter-
ference obtained in dual experts for a number of reasons. In
particular, it is recruited for both cars and faces in car experts
(Gauthier et al., 2000, 2005; McGugin et al., 2012a); the activity
in this area in response to cars correlates with behavioral mea-
sures of car expertise (Gauthier et al., 2000) and although it is
not the only area to show an effect of expertise for cars, when
the task demands are made more difﬁcult, as was the case here,
effects in these other regions drop whereas the expertise effect
in the FFA remains (McGugin et al., in press). Finally, a recent
fMRI study found that car expertise effects in the FFA survived
manipulations of clutter and of divided attention, but that they
were abolished when cars were presented in the context of faces,
especially when the faces were also task-relevant (McGugin et al.,
2014). Much work remains to be done to relate this example
of competition between faces and cars in the FFA with whole
objects and the present ﬁnding of interaction between faces and
transformed objects of expertise during a dual-task that requires
selective attention.
Other ﬁndings of expertise-dependent interference between the
concurrent processing of face and non-face objects of expertise
suggest that not only can faces and objects of expertise be pro-
cessed in a similar manner, as well as neurally close in space and
time, but the neural networks responsible for their HP may not
be functionally independent (Gauthier et al., 2003; Rossion et al.,
2004, 2007; McKeeff et al., 2010; McGugin et al., 2011). Impor-
tantly, it is not necessary to postulate that processing of faces and
cars depend on overlapping sets of neurons to account for compe-
tition between the two domains. It is sufﬁcient to assume that face
and object processing are closer together in experts than novices in
“cerebral functional space”(Kinsbourne andHicks, 1978); cerebral
functional space refers to the physical size of and distance between
brain areas responsible for different functions. This only assumes
that competition is more likely between neural ensembles that are
more densely interconnected, and/or that are separated by fewer
synapses.
In conclusion, our results are consistent with previous ﬁndings
of observable interference across different domains of real-world
expertise where the particular domains are proposed to rely on
a common resource. This functional overlap between face and
non-face domains of expertise has implications for the potential
of extensive learning, as in the case of real-world expertise, to lead
to a dynamic reorganization of cognitive resources. Because most
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normal adults possess a certain degree of expertise with faces,
it may be important to consider training and application envi-
ronments for real-world experts and assess the extent to which
competition between different domains can impact learning and
performance.
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